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Abstract: 
In this paper, we provide the first overview over all political connections for all firms listed on 
the Berlin stock exchange in 1924 and for the same sample of firms four years later. In contrast 
to anecdotal evidence which suggest that these political connections had a positive effect on 
firms’ performance, an event study based on the election in December 1924 and May 1928 
shows only little evidence that political connections had a positive impact on firm value. These 
results complement previous research emphasizing that political connections might have 
mattered less in democracies. Indeed, this seems true for Germany’s first democracy - even 
though it was a very unstable one. 
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The effectiveness of political connections in both democratic1 and authoritarian regimes2 in 
recent periods has been closely examined.3 However, there has been less focus on historical 
episodes. In a seminal paper, Ferguson and Voth quantify the impact of an extreme political 
connection — to the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) – and show that firms that established 
political connections to the NSDAP before Hitler came to power experienced unusually high 
returns. 4  They outperformed firms without such connections by 5 to 8 per cent between January 
and March 1933. However, Ferguson and Voth’s study covers a period in German history when 
the first democracy was in a steep decline and the prospect of Adolf Hitler becoming leader 
was increasingly credible.  
This fits well recent research by Faccio, who has shown that political connections matter 
most in systems of restricted democracy, where there are high levels of corruption, barriers to 
foreign investment and weak institutions.5 According to these findings and assuming that the 
first German democracy was less corruptible, one would clearly expect that political 
connections had a limited influence on firm value in the Weimar Republic. However, 
contemporary observers have suggested that political networks were already advantageous well 
before the rise of the NSDAP. In 1925 a journalist, using the pseudonym Morus, wrote in a left-
wing weekly newspaper: ‘Schau einer an, die sitzen gar nicht am Königsplatz, um das ganze 
deutsche Volk zu betreuen, die wollen nur das Brauereigewerbe oder die Klempnerinnung oder 
den Großgrundbesitz oder die Metallarbeiter versorgen?’6  
                                                          
1 Fisman et al., ‘Estimating the value’; Acemoglu et al., ‘Value of connections’. 
2 Li et al., ‘Political connections’; Feng et al., ‘Mixing business’. 
3 Further research in this area has looked at the existence and impact of bankers on supervisory boards as well as 
at the connections between different firms via supervisory board members (see, for instance, Fohlin, Finance 
capitalism; Windolf, ‘Unternehmensverflechtung’; Windolf  and Beyer, ‘Kooperativer Kapitalismus’; Krenn and 
Marx, ‘Kontinuität’), but not on the value added by having politicians on the boards. Furthermore, all of the above 
focused on samples of firms. We study all firms listed on the Berlin stock exchange.  
4 Ferguson and Voth, ‘Betting on Hitler’. 
5 Faccio, ‘Politically connected firms’ 
6 ‘Look at that, they are not sitting at the square of kings to take care of the needs of all German people. They just 
care about Breweries, the guilds of plumbers, great land owners or metal workers?’ The Königsplatz (today’s Platz 
der Republik) is the square were the parliament was located. Furthermore, he mentions that member bulletins of 
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In this paper we investigate whether contemporary observers were correct in thinking 
that political connections also paid off in the first German democracy, indicating limited 
democracy and weak institutions. We use an event study to identify the advantages of a political 
connection, by comparing the change in the stock price of those firms with a Member of 
Parliament (MP) on the supervisory board to that of the largest firms without a political 
connection, at the time of a general election. The Weimar Republic is generally regarded as 
turbulent and given the political and economic circumstances, two event periods qualify for this 
study: the elections in December 1924 and in May 1928.  
Overall, we find little evidence that the anecdotal claims of certain lucrative political 
connections can be generalised, nor that investors valued firms’ political associations in the first 
German democracy. Only the newly-established high quality connections seemed to add value 
to a firm, by generating significant positive cumulative abnormal returns in the weeks after the 
election. Other variables that measure political connections or the quality of a political 
connection are not significant if we compare them to a control group of unconnected firms, and 
to general market performance. These results indicate that the value of political connections in 
the first German democracy was limited, and may only be beneficial in times of turbulence or 
under certain special conditions. Taking Faccio’s findings as a general rule, we can interpret 
our results as suggesting that the Weimar Republic was less corruptible than is generally 
assumed.7  
Furthermore, with the exception of a recent paper by Grossman and Imai, research on 
political connections has paid little attention to differences in the quality of a political 
                                                          
economic associations proudly reported the number of politicians that were members of its organisation or board 
members of a firm. See Die Weltbühne, 21, 1925, pp. 29; Die Weltbühne, 24, 1928, pp. 256-258. 
7 Other recent studies on the value of political connections for Victorian Britain show mixed results: Braggion and 
Moore, ‘Economic benefits’, detect a significantly better stock market performance of firms with links to a 
Member of Parliament (MP), while Grossman and Imai, ‘Taking the lord's name’, restricting their analysis to 
banks, even find a negative effect on performance. In the likewise relatively democratic environment of interwar 
Japan, also only newly established links to the parliament proved valuable, despite the high level of overall 
connected firms; Okazaki and Sawada, ‘Extent and implications’. 
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connection.8 Thus, we aim to learn more about the types of political connections that mattered 
most. Indeed we find evidence that quality matters: more experienced politicians with more 
influential positions created a higher value than the average politician on a supervisory board.   
Moreover, we provide the first systematic quantitative overview of the political 
connections of the firms listed on the Berlin stock exchange in December 1924, and those that 
were still listed in December 1928. By surveying the political status of nearly 19,000 
supervisory board members and executive officers (CEOs), we provide a clear picture of the 
different quality of political connections. Overall, about 13 per cent of the firms had a politician 
on their supervisory board and about 12 per cent of the firms were connected to the current 
Government in 1924. These shares were somewhat smaller in 1928. The data reveal that larger 
and older firms with larger boards had a higher likelihood of having a political connection.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the first section, the literature on political 
connections is reviewed, along with anecdotal evidence for the interwar years.  The second 
section describes the political situation in Weimar Germany. An overview of sample firms, 
connected politicians and parties gives a general view of political connections at that time. Their 
actual benefits are revealed in an event study, after which the final section concludes. 
  
                                                          
8 Grossman and Imai, ‘Taking the lord's name’. 
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I 
Generally, political connections are valuable for a firm, since they ensure that its 
interests are supported and represented politically. This support can take many different forms. 
Political connections might have facilitated preferential access to credit, as shown by Cull and 
Xu for present-day China and Khwaja and Mian for present-day Pakistan.9 In a cross-country 
study including 35 countries over the period 1997-2002, Faccio et al. have found evidence that 
connected firms received better treatment from the government in times of crisis, with a higher 
likelihood of being bailed out.10 Backman provides evidence of preferential treatment by 
government-controlled banks11; De Soto documents evidence of tax discounts, and Stigler 
discusses regulatory benefits.12 The magnitude of such advantages depends on the political and 
economic freedom in that particular context.13 In less free countries, connections are more 
widespread and there has been significant emphasis in the research on developing countries in 
south-east Asia14, and China15. Still, links to politics proved likewise beneficial in terms of 
market valuation in democratic countries such as the United States.16 
There is a lot of anecdotal evidence suggesting that a political connection likewise 
mattered in interwar Germany, and that contemporary observers knew about these potential 
advantages.17 A well known example of preferential access to credit is the famous Barmat 
affair.18 The two Barmat brothers, owners and CEOs of the Barmat company, made large profits 
during the hyperinflation of 1923, when they continued to expand their business and bought 
other firms.19 The largest firm in their firm group was Amexima, a firm that mainly imported 
                                                          
9 Cull and Xu, ‘Institutions, ownership, and finance’; Khwaja and Mian, ‘Politically connected firms’. 
10 Faccio et al., ‘Political connections’. 
11 Backman, Asian Eclipse. 
12 De Soto, The other path; Stigler, ‘Economic regulation’. 
13 Pantzalis et al., ‘Political elections’. 
14 Fisman, ‘Estimating the value’; Chen et al., ‘Firm's political connection’. 
15 Li et al., ‘Political connections’; Feng et al., ‘Mixing business’. 
16 Fisman et al., ‘Estimating the value’; Acemoglu et al., ‘Value of connections’; Goldman et al. ‘Politically 
connected boards’. 
17 Klein, Korruption, has recently collected famous cases of corruption in Interwar Germany.  
18 See for instance Klein, Korruption, pp. 239-252. 
19 Ufermann, Könige der Inflation. 
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food into Germany. After 1923, when the hyperinflation had ended, it suddenly became much 
harder to get access to credit and they did not have sufficient liquidity to support their new 
acquisitions. In 1924, it became public knowledge that the Barmat brothers had solved this 
problem by bribing officials and politicians with private credits or board memberships. Private 
banks, the Central Bank (Reichsbank) and the Post Office, which also granted loans, were all 
involved. For example, the Postmaster General, Anton Höfle (Centre party), received a private 
payment from the Barmat brothers. This payment was arranged with the help of an MP from 
the same party group, Hermann Lange-Hagemann. Lange-Hagemann was member of the board 
of several firms that were part of the Barmat group. In exchange, Höfle made a large loan to 
the Barmat company. Although Höfle had already repaid his private credit before he signed the 
loan for Barmat, he lost immunity and was arrested in 1924. He died in prison three months 
later. Hermann Lange-Hagemann left the Centre party, but stayed in Parliament. Many other 
politicians from different parties were involved in the scandal, the most famous being the 
former Chancellor for the Social Democrats, Gustav Bauer.  
In the aftermath of this scandal, the Communist Party initiated a heated debate in the 
Prussian Parliament. They accused the Government of preferring to bail out firms whose leaders 
had well-established ties to politicians.20 The debate included the bailout of Hugo Stinnes AG, 
which struggled after the death of its founder.21 In the same year, Reemtsma, a cigarette 
producer, also seemed to benefit from political connections. The State increased taxation on 
warehousing of raw tobacco, but only if the tobacco was stored within a company. Reemtsma 
had already learned of the changes while the law was being debated. When the law came into 
effect, the company had already secretly outsourced its material stock, unlike many 
competitors. Moreover, it was rumoured that political connections prevented the firm from 
                                                          
20 See also: Verhandlungen des Preussischen Landtags, 2. WP. Bd. 5, 95 Sitzung, 11. November 1925, 6267, 6326. 
21 Klein, Korruption, p. 223. 
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being accused of tax fraud.22 A few years later, Reemtsma would again benefit from strong 
connections with the Ministry of Finance.23 In 1929 the tobacco company wanted to take over 
the smaller cigarette producer Batschari, which had accumulated a huge tax debt. The Ministry 
of Finance, without any clear explanation, cancelled that debt. 
Another well-connected firm was the Siemens & Halske Company. In the period of 
slow and uncertain economic activity following the First World War, the Berlin-based 
engineering company benefitted from contracts with the Federal Post to establish and develop 
the telephone network, which gave it a secure income. At the time, Siemens had a board 
member who was connected to the Government,24 and the company enjoyed preferential 
treatment from the Postal Ministry throughout the 1920s.25  
Considered together, theory, research from other countries and timeframes, and 
anecdotal evidence suggest that investors believed that political connections improved firms’ 
performance via information advantages, support of business activities in general and 
protection against prosecution, thus increasing firm value. 
 
II 
The first German democracy is well known for its political and economic instability. 
Particularly in the early years, the country faced enormous problems. The Treaty of Versailles 
greatly reduced Germany’s economic base – it lost 10 per cent of its population, 80 per cent of 
its iron ore resources and 40 per cent of its blast furnaces. Moreover, the Treaty imposed a huge 
financial burden in the form of reparation payments.26 In addition to high unemployment rates 
and the virtual exclusion from international trade, the expansionary monetary policy constituted 
                                                          
22 Klein, Korruption, pp. 421-427. 
23 Jacobs, Rauch und Macht, pp. 46-57; Klein, Korruption, pp. 426-430. 
24 Carl Friedrich von Siemens was an active politician for the German Democratic Party in the early 1920s. 
25 Feldenkirchen, Siemens, pp. 262-272. 
26 Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 239-243. 
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another threat to the economy as well as to society, resulting in the hyperinflation of 1923.27 
On the other hand, the defeat in the First World War brought about important changes, such as 
the abolition of the monarchy and the introduction of universal suffrage. In contrast to Imperial 
Germany, the newly founded Weimar Republic was a true parliamentary democracy. Its central 
legislative body, the Reichstag, was more powerful than its predecessor. The Constitution had 
fewer federal elements and provided the Parliament with broader powers to control the 
government. Most notably, it appointed the federal government, which in the Empire had been 
in the power of the Emperor.28 
Conflicts between social classes and cultural milieus characterised the whole period,29 
and were also apparent in politics.30 Most of the various government coalitions lasted for only 
a few months – indeed, there were 14 different governments before 1930,31 – and several 
authors have questioned the efficiency of the Reichstag.32 However, in terms of predictability 
of voting behaviour and the ability to exert power in the end, recent literature has shown that it 
functioned relatively well.33 Consequently, the composition of the parliament and therefore 
elections were of prime importance. To reveal the actual benefit of a political connection, we 
concentrate on two elections, December 1924 and May 1928. One might argue that the frequent 
changes in government coalitions might also be useful events. However, since most connections 
were connections to the parties that were constantly part of the government, the changes in – 
arguably weak – governments did not affect the connected politicians in our sample.  
By studying general elections, however, we can test whether firms directly benefitted 
from a link to the parliament, that is, by nominating an MP to be a supervisory board member. 
                                                          
27 Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 241-247. 
28 Boldt, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 230-242. 
29 Winkler, Weimar, pp. 285-305. 
30 Sontheimer, ‘Weimarer Republik‘, pp. 454-464. 
31 Wirsching, Weimarer Republik, pp. 20-23. 
32 Hermens, Demokratie oder Anarchie?; Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen. 
33 Lehmann, ‘Chaotic shop-talk’. 
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We can compare these firms to firms that had no political connection. Elections from 1930 
onwards are disqualified as possible events, because Germany was governed via presidential 
decrees, substantially reducing the influence of single MPs.34 Likewise, the first Weimar 
election in 1920 took place in the wake of significant political and economic turmoil. 
Revolution, the Kapp Putsch and the Ruhraufstand brought the republic to the brink of a civil 
war. The stock markets were clearly affected by these events as well, showing a lot of price 
volatility. Thus, to avoid further bias, we focus on the elections in December 1924 and May 
1928, because both were followed by a period of relative political stability: unusually for the 
time, the subsequent governments were in office for at least one year.35  
In 1924 the economy recovered from hyperinflation, and experienced higher rates of 
growth in industrial production and a low rate of unemployment, of about 4.9 per cent.36 This 
economic stabilisation also translated into a consolidation of political powers. The main losers 
in the election of December 1924 were the extreme parties on the left and the right. The 
communists (KPD) lost 17 seats while parties of the extreme right lost 18 seats. The German 
National People’s Party (DNVP) – a right-wing (but not extreme) party – won some seats, but 
less than the extreme right had lost. The winners were the democratic parties in the middle of 
the political spectrum, such as the Centre Party (Zentrum) and the German Democratic Party 
(DDP) which both won four seats, and the German People’s Party (DVP) which won six seats. 
The major winners of the election, however, were the Social Democrats, gaining 31 seats; 
nonetheless, they could not translate their political success into political power and remained 
in opposition until 1928.37 The Coalition led by Hans Luther lasted for about a year, a relatively 
long period compared to other governments in the Weimar Republic. The only government that 
                                                          
34 Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen, p. 45. 
35 See Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen, p. 45.  ¸Winkler, Weimar, pp. 109-142. 
36 Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 252-257; Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen, p. 38. 
37 Kolb, Weimarer Republik, pp. 81-82; Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen, p. 44. 
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stayed in power for longer was that of Hermann Müller, after the election in May 1928.38 In 
this election, the most notable result was the losses by the right-wing parties, DNVP (dropping 
from 103 seats to 30) and NSDAP (dropping from 14 seats to 2). While the parties of the 
political centre remained more or less unchanged, the Social Democrats gained an additional 
22 seats, consolidating their power. After this election, the Social Democrats formed 
Government, which they held until the end of parliamentary rule in 1930.39 In 1928 the 
economy had already cooled, and a further descent was to come.40 Yet the employment rate 
was unaffected and investors were not worried.41 Moreover, while in 1924 investors’ 
expectations had been formed based on the recent hyperinflation, investors in 1928 had 
experienced a period of stability, which might have resulted in a different assessment of the 
importance of a political connection.  
 
III 
By the end of 1924, 1064 firms were listed on the Berlin stock exchange, with a nominal share 
value of 9759 million Reichsmark and a market value of approximately 7000 million RM. This 
equals a market capitalisation of 11 to 15 per cent of GDP,42 which is about half the amount of 
the estimate provided by Rajan and Zingales.43 The average firm had share capital of about 9.3 
million RM, was about 33.6 years old and had a board with 9.4 members. The most dominant 
group was heavy industry, covering about 23 per cent of all firms, followed by light industry.44 
                                                          
38 Lehmann, ‘Chaotic shop-talk’, p. 85. 
39 Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen, p. 45. 
40 When the central bank intervened in order to prevent a bubble in 1927, the result was a medium-severe stock 
market crash. Net investment and GDP were likewise affected. See Voth, ‘With a bang’. 
41 Voth, ‘High wages’, p. 804; Voth, ‘With a bang’. 
42 Nominal GDP was taken from Burhop and Wolff, ‘Compromise estimate’. 
43 Rajan and Zingales, ‘The great reversals’, cover all stock exchanges in Germany and not just the central one in 
Berlin. However, Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer, in ‘Berlin stock exchange’, have recently shown for that 1913 
even if all stock exchanges are covered, the overall market capitalisation is slightly lower. A similar revision of 
the Rajan and Zingales, ‘The great reversals’, data has been made for the US and the UK, see Musacchio and 
Turner, ‘Law and finance hypothesis’, p. 528. 
44 We used the sectors provided by Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften and aggregated these categories 
into ten broader categories. Please see online appendix Table A1 for further information. 
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To get a second benchmark year close to the election in May 1928, we checked which of the 
sample firms were still listed in December 1928. The overall figures remain relatively constant. 
Firm data for the benchmark years are taken from the Handbuch der Deutschen 
Aktiengesellschaften, a stock market manual.45 This record includes firm-specific variables 
such as the name of the firm, director and supervisory board members, size of an issue (total 
value of all shares), the year of incorporation, location of headquarters and sector.46  
Political connections were identified by comparing the names of supervisory board 
members and members of the directorate with Reichstag MPs. We count a political connection 
if a member of the supervisory board or the directorate was a member of the current parliament, 
or had been an MP at any point since 1919, which is the year of the founding meeting of the 
first German democracy, the National Assembly.47 The results were compared and 
crosschecked with the Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsräte 1925 and 1928.48 We use 
more than one source to reduce the likelihood of mistakes that can arise, for instance, due to 
misspelling of names or omissions in the manuals.49 
                                                          
45 More precisely, the data are taken from Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (Darmstadt 1925; 1929), 
each referring to the end of the preceding year. 
46 We are grateful to Carsten Burhop for providing us with an unpublished dataset of all firms listed on the Berlin 
stock exchange in December 1924, including name of the firm, size of the issue year of incorporation, location of 
headquarters and sector. This significantly reduced the amount of data that we had to collect. 
47 We do not consider state parliaments. The members of the Reichstag are published in a database provided by 
the Bavarian state library (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek). 
By considering only supervisory board members who had been MPs since the National Assembly in 1919, we 
omit the political connections of supervisory board members that were MPs in the Empire, but not in the Weimar 
Republic. However, since we capture all politicians who started their political career in the Empire but were still 
politically active in the Weimar Republic, the bias should be limited, especially since the political ‘value’ in terms 
of the political influence of a person who was an MP in the Empire but not in the Weimar Republic was most 
likely very limited in 1924 – about six years after the end of Imperial Germany and almost a decade after the 
beginning of the First World War. 
48 Ferguson and Voth, ‘Betting on Hitler’, and Faccio, ‘Politically connected firms’, also include rather informal 
political connections such as financial donations to parties. These payments, however, are very difficult to identify 
and summarise for all parties in our observation period. It is already difficult to get this information for the Nazi 
party. Furthermore, the careful identification of the formal political connections for all firms and parties was 
already very time and resource consuming. Altogether, for 1924 and 1928, we checked the biographies of 18,769 
board members. Thus, although we are aware that informal connections also mattered, the identification of these 
connections would go far beyond the scope of this research project. 
49 This is quite a common problem as Radandt, ‘Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsräte‘, points out. 
Furthermore, to avoid such mistakes we checked the bibliographic information carefully. 
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These formal and public political connections were evident to investors. Board 
memberships and boards of directors were made public in the Adressbuch der Direktoren und 
Aufsichtsräte and – based on the handbook – discussed in the media.50 Supervisory boards were 
elected by the general assemblies and were not just regulatory bodies in this period. Members 
of the board were often involved in strategically important firm decisions.51 The usual term of 
office was five years and the supervisory board had to have at least three members. On average, 
a firm had nine board members and the size of the board increased with firm size: Deutsche 
Bank, for instance, had 58 board members in December 1924.  
To learn about differences in the quality of political connections, we distinguish 
between firms that had a political connection to a current or to a former MP. We further 
differentiate between different party affiliations, in particular whether the connected MP was 
or is affiliated with a party of the current government. We also collected information on years 
in parliament and whether the politician was ever board president or held a ministerial position, 
because this should increase the power to influence decisions at the firm level and at the political 
level, respectively.  
In our first benchmark year of 1924, Morus reports that 65 of the 463 MPs, i.e. about 
14 per cent, held board memberships.52 This proportion is remarkably stable. In 1928, Morus 
reports that about 16 per cent of the MPs and about 11 per cent of the Members of the Prussian 
State Parliament were ‘close’ to industry. He further claims that although the overall number 
of politicians on supervisory boards seems rather low, a single man from a certain sector or firm 
in the right parliamentary group would be sufficient to influence policies in their favour.53  
                                                          
50 Die Weltbühne, 21, 1925, pp. 29-31; Die Weltbühne, 24, 1928, pp. 256-258. 
51 Windolf, ‘Unternehmensverflechtung’, p. 191. Since 1884, all persons, regardless of whether they held shares 
or not, could be elected. See Burhop, ‘Banken’ p. 14. 
52 Altogether, the 65 MPs held 269 board memberships in 1924. In 1928, 72 MPs held 276 board memberships. 
See Die Weltbühne, 21, 1925, pp. 29-31; Die Weltbühne, 24, 1928, pp. 256-258. Please note that Morus also reports 
the board memberships of firm that were not listed in Berlin. 
53 Die Weltbühne, 24, 1928, pp. 256-258. 
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Table 1 provides an overview of the political connections for all Berlin-listed firms in 
our benchmark years. About 13 per cent of the listed firms had a political connection in the 
form of a current or a former MP, or the CEO, at the end of 1924. Of these, 6.2 per cent had a 
former MP on their supervisory board. However, this does not mean that these individuals had 
abandoned politics. Some of them re-entered the parliament after 1928. By 1928, the overall 
number of firms with political connections deceased slightly to 9.3 per cent.54  
Most political connections were direct connections to the government, but only about 2 
per cent in 1924 and about 1.5 per cent in 1928 were connections to a former minister. Morus 
claims that ex-ministers were particularly attractive for firms, but that while ministers were still 
in office they avoided official connections to industry to maintain the impression of a clean and 
uncorrupted Republic.55 Indeed, we find no current minister on a supervisory board, however, 
many of the former ministers served on supervisory boards while still members of parliament. 
Hans von Raumer for instance, who was Minister of Economic Affairs until he resigned in 
1923, remained in Parliament until September 1930. In 1924, he held eight board memberships 
of Berlin listed firms and was even president of the board of Deutsche Webstoffwerke AG, a 
textile producer with headquarters in Berlin (see also Table 2). Another former minister was 
Otto Landsberg. He was Minister of Justice in the very first parliament, until 1920. After a short 
sabbatical from politics, he re-entered the parliament with the Social Democrats in 1924. In 
1924, he held two board memberships, with Schlesische Boden-Credit-Actien-Bank and 
Magdeburger Strassen-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. 
Only eleven firms (1 per cent) were managed and partly owned by CEOs who were 
politically active. One of these was Albert Vögler, who on the boards of Siemens & Halske AG, 
Siemens-Schuckertwerke and Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG (see also Table 2).  
                                                          
54 However, since we only list the firms that were already listed in 1924, it is possible that the overall share 
remained constant. 
55 Die Weltbühne, 21, 1925, pp. 29-31. 
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Panel B of Table 1 shows that most connections were to moderate centre parties. The 
most extreme connections were those to the right-wing German National Peoples Party 
(DNVP). We do not find connections to more extreme parties. Most connections were to the 
German Democratic Party (DDP), a liberal party that clearly supported economic interests;  the 
German Peoples Party56 (DVP), and the rather conservative Centre Party (Zentrum). We find 
very few Social Democrats (SPD) and Independent Social Democrats57 (USPD) on supervisory 
boards and all of them in public or non-profit organisations. Morus claims that this might have 
been caused by the ‘Barmat Affair’,58 after which the Social Democrat Gustav Bauer resigned 
from all board memberships.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
A closer look at the politicians on supervisory boards reveals that some of them were 
well-known networkers. Table 2 provides an overview of the politicians that held the largest 
number of board memberships in our sample. The industrialist Victor Weidtmann, for instance, 
was a member of 19 different boards in 1924. Most of these firms were from heavy industry, 
but Weidtmann was also on the board of Deutsche Bank, the most influential universal bank at 
the time.59 We assume that good networkers played a central role, especially since they often 
represented large parts of particular sectors and not just a single firm. For instance, Albert 
Vögler, who held 12 board memberships in 1924 and 13 in 1928, co-initiated the establishment 
of the trust of large steel mills Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG in the mid-1920s. The Trust 
                                                          
56 The DVP were principally liberal: in contrast to the DDP, the party was rather right-leaning, see Treue, Deutsche 
Parteiprogramme, pp. 117-130. 
57 The aims of the Social Democrats were defined in their Erfurt Programme of 1891, which contained several 
practical demands in favour of the working class, such as the improvement of labour conditions, the eight-hour 
working day and free health care. See Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme, p. 76. 
58 See previous section, Die Weltbühne, 21, 1925, pp. 29-31, and also Klein, Korruption, pp. 229-228. 
59 See Lehmann, ‘Taking firms’. 
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cooperated with the Government and used its influence to achieve favourable terms for taxation 
and other privileges.60 Furthermore, the overall number of board memberships of these 
politicians was much higher if we also include non-listed companies, or firms that were not 
joint stock companies. Hans von Raumer, for instance, held 14 board memberships overall, 
Hermann Fischer 46 and ten Hompel more than 15 altogether in 1924.61 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Furthermore, the connections varied across sectors (see Table 3) and political parties. 
In mining, for instance, approximately every fourth firm had a politician on the supervisory 
board in 1924 as well as in 1928. Branches with a direct business link to public or state matters, 
such as transportation and public utility, likewise rank among the sectors with the largest 
number of connected firms. For the year 1932, Ferguson and Voth also find the highest 
concentration of political connections to the Nazis in these sectors.62 However, while both 
sample years show that less than 8 per cent of steel firms (part of heavy industry) were 
connected, the NSDAP affiliation of these firms was nearly 60 per cent in 1932. The NSDAP 
had a strong interest in controlling that part of the economy, since it would become instrumental 
in war. Thus, arguably the NSDAP MPs selected themselves onto the supervisory boards of 
steel producing firms in around 1932 with a clear interest in controlling production. On the 
other hand, steel industrialists might also have had a strong interest in cooperating with the 
NSDAP members, as they expected them to increase the demand for armaments. 
 
                                                          
60 See Reckendrees, Das Stahltrust-Projekt, pp. 222-238. 
61 Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsräte, Band I & II, 1925/1926. Die Weltbühne, 21, 1925, pp. 29-31. 
62 Ferguson and Voth, ‘Betting on Hitler’, p. 124. 
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(Table 3 about here) 
 
The connections to the various sectors were not distributed equally among the political 
parties. However, given the small number of overall connections for most parties, only the 
shares of the two liberal parties merit interpretation. In both years, the national-liberal DVP was 
represented to a greater extent in heavy industry and mining, whereas the left-liberal DDP 
focused on banking, manufacturing and transportation. 
In Table 4, we compare the main characteristics of connected and unconnected firms 
for various types of political connection in 1924 and 1928 for the full sample. There is a clear 
pattern of significant differences in both years. Firms with political connections were usually 
older than the average unconnected firm and had larger supervisory boards. Moreover, firms 
with a political connection had a significant higher share price than unconnected firms. This 
might indicate that political connections paid off. However, highly capitalised firms often had 
a much higher probability of having a politician on their supervisory board, which might also 
drive the share price. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
The location of the headquarters, transformed into a distance to Berlin, is a proxy for 
asymmetric information. Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer have recently provided evidence 
that distance is positively correlated with information asymmetries based on a sample of all 
German firms that were listed on any of the German stock markets in 1913.63 Furthermore, 
                                                          
63 Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer, ‘Berlin stock exchange’. 
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Lampe and Ploeckl have shown – based on Bavarian telephone exchanges in 1900 – that 
theoretically ‘weightless’ communication like phone calls was subject to substantial distance 
cost, similar to physically transported mail.64 Thus, it is possible that firms further away from 
Berlin used political connections to reduce information costs. However, the location of the 
headquarters did not seem to matter, although firms that had just established a connection had 
more remote locations.  
 
IV 
In general, a stock price represents the aggregate expectations of market participants 
about the future performance of the firm. An increase (decrease) in a firm’s stock price reflects 
the expectation that future dividends will rise (fall), which in turn depends on the firm’s future 
profitability.65 Besides the firm-specific characteristics, we expect that the profitability of a firm 
depends to a considerable extent on its political connections. Changes in stock prices after 
elections would therefore indicate shifts in expectations about the political connections of the 
firm.66 We study the impact of a political connection in the elections in 1924 and 1928 with 
standard event study methodology:67 we calculate the abnormal returns of firms with 
supervisory board members who were elected for the first time; those who lost their seat in this 
election, and those who already had a seat but were re-elected. We do not consider firms that 
had a former politician on the board, i.e. politicians who had left Parliament in an earlier 
election, since we assume that the election will only have a limited impact on the value of this 
                                                          
64 Lampe and Ploeckl, ‘Spanning the globe’. 
65 Sattler, ‘Do markets punish’. 
66 Previous research yields more predictions how stocks may respond to elections. An overview is given by Sattler, 
‘Do markets punish’.  In general, it is possible that electoral outcomes are at least partly anticipated in advance. In 
that case investors form clear expectations before the election takes place. However, anticipation is lowest for 
close elections, when either parties or blocs have roughly equal chances of winning. However, even if one side is 
more popular, elections are rarely perfectly predictable, and both sides retain a nontrivial chance of winning. 
67 For similar approaches see, for instance, Ferguson and Voth, ‘Betting on Hitler’; Turner and Zhan, ‘Property 
rights’; Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al., ‘Political stock market’, or Grossman and Imai, ‘Taking the lord's name’. 
MacKinlay, in ‘Event studies’, gives an overview of this method. 
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type of a political connection. We exclude the shares of insurance companies, because trading 
of those shares was heavily restricted68.  We also exclude banks for two reasons: First, we aim 
at comparing firms with similar characteristics, which only diverge in terms of their political 
connections. By focussing on industrial firms, we get a more homogenous sample. Furthermore, 
the channels via which political connections improved banks’ performances are fundamentally 
different to those of industrial firms. Second, only two banks got a new connection in 1924 and 
none did in 1928, so there is very little change within the bank sample for the period being 
studied.   
Overall, we observe 35 firms in 1924 that had a supervisory board member, who won a 
seat in the election. For six of these firms, the supervisory board member was elected for the 
first time. In 1928, we observe 33 firms that had a board member who won a seat in the election, 
but only two firms had a board member who was elected for the first time. We also observe 
board members who were MPs before the election, but lost their seat (Lost connection). Twelve 
firms lost their direct link to the parliament in this way in 1924, and three in 1928. 
Since share capital seems crucial for the existence of a connection (see Table 5), we 
selected the largest unconnected firms that were regularly traded as the control group. To get a 
large enough sample, we collected prices for 53 unconnected firms in 1924 and 64 in 1928. 
Thus the event study sample comprises 100 firms for each year. Altogether, we collected 2,200 
weekly stock prices.69 Table 5 shows the various types of political connections in the event 
study and the unconnected firms. 
 
                                                          
68 They only issued ‘vinkulierte Namensaktien’, that is, registered shares with restricted transferability. For details, 
see Gelman and Burhop, ‘Taxation’, p. 4. 
69 We collected prices for 100 firms and 11 weeks per event (200*11). Prices were taken from the Berliner 
Börsenzeitung. Prices are listed as a percentage of a security’s nominal value. The data are available at the 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin or online:   (20.02.2017) 
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(Table 5 about here) 
 
The general concept of an event study is presented in Figure 1. In an estimation period, which 
is unaffected by the event [T-1, T1], the parameters later used to determine the expected 
(normal) returns of every firm are calculated. The event occurs at T0 and can affect the stock 
market during the event window [T1, T2], which can lie on either side of T0. We consider three 
different event windows: one symmetric one, covering one week before and one week after the 
event [-1;1], and two more over a period of one [0;1] and two weeks [0;2] after the event. These 
are all preceded by an estimation period of six weeks. 
 
 (Figure 1 about here) 
 
The crucial calculation in an event study is the estimation of the expected return, which is 
subtracted from the actual return in the event window. The resulting abnormal return reflects 
the impact of the event itself. More specifically, we check whether the (re-)election of an MP 
who is on the board of a firm affects the market valuation of that firm. A popular method is the 
market model, which relates the return of any given security to the return of the market 
portfolio, thereby taking into account overall market effects. Based on the period-t returns of 
security i, the expected return  is: 
 
  With  and              (1) 
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Where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on stock i and the market portfolio, 
respectively.  is the error term, whose variance is assumed to be constant over time. We take 
the weekly blue-chip index as introduced by Ronge as a proxy for the stock market portfolio.70 
Abnormal returns are calculated for security i at time t as: ARit = Rit −E(Rit), where Rit is a 
stock’s realised return and where E(Rit) is its expected return in the absence of the event, as 
calculated above. We then calculate the cumulated abnormal return per firm in the event 
window. 
   (2), 
 
Then the average cumulated abnormal return (ACAR) from t=T1 to t=T2 is calculated as 
follows: 
 
   (3), 
 
where N is the number of stocks in our sample during each event. To test the significance 
of the ACARs, the variance of the ACARs is estimated by using cross-sectional variance across 
the cumulative abnormal returns of the various companies. This cross-sectional approach takes 
account of an increase in event period variance.71 Using the cross-sectional approach to form 
an estimator of the variance gives:  
                                                          
70 Ronge, ‘Die langfristige Rendite‘. 
71 Campbell et al., Econometrics of Financial Markets, p. 168; Turner and Zhan, ‘Property rights’, p. 620. 
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 (4), 
The test statistic is then calculated as: , which is asymptotically 
standard normal.  
To see the difference in the performance of connected and unconnected firms, the CAR 
is regressed on four different variables that describe the characteristics of the political 
connections, along with various firm characteristics that serve as controls, according to the 
following equation: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜒𝜒 ∗ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (5) 
 
The variable ‘political connections’ covers the different measures for connections, as displayed 
in table 5. Furthermore, we construct an index that accounts for differences in the ‘quality’ of 
a political connection. This index increases with the number of board seats and with other 
factors emphasising the quality of a connection: the time a politician served as MP until the 
event, and whether the politician was board president, CEO of the company or a former 
minister.72 Xi is a vector that covers other firm-specific variables such as joint stock capital, 
size of the supervisory board, age of the firm and distance of headquarters from Berlin. 
                                                          
72 Formally, the index is built according to the following equation: indexi = connectioni+ CEOi + ministeri + 
mandatesi+ years as politiciani, where connectioni is equal to one, if the firm had some sort of a political 
connection. CEOi is equal to one if the CEO was a current of former MP. ministeri is equal to 1 if the MP was a 
former minister. mandatesi covers the percentage share of the number of board memberships divided by the highest 
number a politician had in this year. years as politiciani, is calculated as the number of years the board member 
was a member of the parliament divided by the largest number of years observed in this year. Thus the latter two 
values also rank between 0 and 1 and the index ranks between zero and five. If a firm had more than one politician 
on the supervisory board, we use the largest index. 
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Moreover, table 5 reveals that the control group of the largest firms shows significant 
differences to the connected firms, which might lead to biased results. Thus, we use another 
more precise matching technique, coarsened exact matching (CEM), as described by Iacus et 
al.73 Given the mostly continuous covariates in our data and the limited number of observations, 
it seems preferable to the more common propensity score matching, which often fails to find 
exact matches.74 The method restricts the data in a way that common support is empirically 
given and imbalances between the treated and the control group are reduced ex-ante. The 
matching algorithm simply coarsens each variable in the data, thereby creating a set of variable-
specific strata around the exact values. The bandwidth of these can be set manually, if desired.75 
In a next step, all strata not containing both a treated and a control group observation are 
dropped. Afterwards, common parametric models like OLS can be applied to the remaining 
variables. 
 
V 
In a first step, we are interested in whether the ACARs of the connected firms differ 
significantly from zero. Table 6 provides the ACARS for the three event windows. Newly 
elected board members, seem to have on average positive cumulated returns (5.7 percent in 
1924 and 11.1 in 1928), particularly after the election, but the effect is not significant. The firms 
that lost their direct link to the parliament underperformed the market, which indicates some 
lost value of the political connection albeit not significantly in 1928. The same effect, however, 
shows up for the overall connected firms and the control group in 1924. Thus, compared to the 
market performance, firms did not seem to benefit from a political connection. 
                                                          
73 Iacus et al., ‘Multivariate matching methods’. 
74 For a more detailed overview of the advantages of the method, see King et al., ‘Comparative effectiveness’. 
75 In our example, we manually set breakpoints when there is plausible reasoning. Distance to Berlin is split into 
Berlin-based (<10km) and based in another city. Firm age is classified into start-up (<5 years), founded after 1900 
(<25 years) and before 1900 (>25 years). 
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 (Table 6 about here) 
In a second step, we analyse whether the CARs are significantly different from a control 
group of unconnected firms. Thus we apply the regression approach presented in equation (5). 
The results are presented in Table 7. The dependent variable in models (1) – (4) is the CAR in 
a symmetric event window, i.e. the returns one week before and one week after the election. In 
Models (5) – (8), the dependent variable is the CAR until two weeks after the election 
respectively. We include the CARs of both elections in one regression to increase the degrees 
of freedom. Not before the results of the election became public, i.e. only in the latter 
specification, a positive stock market effect materialises for newly established political 
connections. Board members were considered valuable by investors at the Berlin stock 
exchange once they were elected as MP for the first time. The effect is even more significant 
for the connections with a higher quality as reflected in the sign of the variable ‘Index new 
connection’. The other types of connections on the other hand did not result in an abnormally 
positive market reaction in 1924, neither did the various firm characteristics like share capital 
or board size.76 
(Table 7 about here) 
Thus, the fact that stock prices of connected firms were higher seems at least partly driven by 
a causal effect. However, only new connections seem to matter but not connections in general. 
This can either mean that investors already anticipated re-elected MPs or that political elections 
did not matter too much. The fact that lost connections did also not have an effect supports the 
                                                          
76 This outcome is consistent with Deloof and Vermoesen, ‘Value of corporate boards’, who find no positive effect 
of board size in times of crisis. 
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latter. These results are robust, if we only use firms that match the characteristics of the 
connected firms (see Table 8). 
 
VI 
By studying the biographies of nearly 19,000 supervisory board members and CEOs in 
two sample years, 1924 and 1928, we provide the first quantitative overview of political 
connections in the first German democracy. By examining such links in the Weimar Republic, 
we extend the existing research on Germany to earlier periods.77 Furthermore, we differentiate 
the quality of the political connections by collecting information on whether the politician was 
president of the board or former minister and the years he has had spent in parliament for his 
respective party. 
Overall, about 13 per cent of the firms had a politician on their supervisory board or 
board of directors and about 12 per cent had a connection to the current government at the end 
of 1924. These numbers decreased slightly by 1928. Very few firms, however, had a previous 
minister on their supervisory board (2.0 and 1.5 per cent in 1928 respectively). The most active 
politicians on supervisory boards were often industrialists, who – as implied by the anecdotal 
evidence – tried to benefit by gaining political power and influence.  
A comparison of the main characteristics of connected and unconnected firms reveals 
that those firms with a large board, large share capital, older firms and firms with a higher share 
value had a higher likelihood of establishing political connections. Moreover, some sectors such 
as mining were much more connected than others. Sectors with a direct business link to public 
                                                          
77 See Ferguson and Voth, ‘Betting on Hitler’. The examination of political connections in Imperial Germany must 
be left to future research. Including this period would shed light on the effectiveness of connections under various 
regime types. 
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or state matters, such as transportation and public utilities, also rank among the sectors with the 
largest number of connected firms.   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that these political connections had a positive impact on 
firm performance, however, our event study of the general elections in December 1924 and 
May 1928, reveals little evidence of this. Either the anecdotal evidence is only based on casual 
observations and cannot be generalised, or the advantage of the connected firms was barely 
reflected in the share prices. In either case, taking Faccio’s findings as a general rule, our 
findings indicate that the democratic institutions seemed to work quite well in the Weimar 
Republic.78 Our results also further emphasize the importance of the findings of Ferguson and 
Voth.79 There was indeed a large difference between the value of a political connection to the 
government in a dictatorship compared to a political connection in the preceding democracy, 
even though it was not a very stable one. 
78 Faccio, ‘Politically connected firms’. 
79 Ferguson and Voth, ‘Betting on Hitler’. 
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Table 1: Overview political connections of supervisory board members and CEOs listed in 
Berlin
Panel A: Types of political connections December 1924 December 1928 
Number of 
firms % all firms 
Number of 
firms % all firms 
All political connections (BM and 
CEO) 138 13.0 88 9.3 
Thereof: 
All political connections board members 
(BM) 131 12.3 88 9.3 
All political connections to a governing 
party (BM and CEO) 124 11.7 83 8.8 
All political connections to a governing 
party (BM) 118  11.1  83 8.8 
Political connections to a former MP 
(BM) 66 6.2 38 4.0 
BM is or was board president 24 2.2 16 1.7 
BM was Minister 21 2.0 14 1.5 
CEO is or was politician 11 1.0 1 0.1 
Unconnected firms 926 87.0 856 90.7 
Panel B: Connections to Parties (BM 
and CEO)* 
Number of 
firms 
% of all 
connections 
Number of 
firms 
% of all 
connections 
Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP) 3 2.1 4 4.2 
German Democratic Party (DDP) 48 32.9 34 35.8 
German Nationals Peoples Party (DNVP) 9 6.2 5 5.3 
German Peoples Party (DVP) 55 37.7 29 30.5 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) 12 8.2 7 7.4 
Centre Party 11 7.5 15 15.8 
others 8 5.5 1 1.1 
Total number of firms 1064 100 944 100 
Note: The parties that were part of the government before the election in December 1924 were The DVP, the 
Centre Party and the DDP. After the election in December 1924, BVP and DNVP joint the coalition. In these 
tables, we count all five parties as connections to the government. In 1928, the government consisted of BVP, 
DDP, DVP, SPD and Centre party, respectively (Falter et al 1986, p. 45). Since a firm can have more than one 
politician on the supervisory board and therefore connections to more than just one party, the total number of 
connected firms in panel B may exceed the number of political connections in panel A.  
Source: see text 
Table 2: Networkers 
1924 No. of board 
memberships 
Party 
affiliation 
Legislative 
periods 
Occupation 
Victor Weidtmann 19 DVP 1 Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
Hermann Fischer 15 DDP 3 Lawyer  
Albert Vögler 12 DVP 2 Engineer, Entrepreneur 
Carl Friedrich von Siemens 11 DDP 2 Engineer, Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
Hans von Raumer 8 DVP 3 Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
1928 No. of board 
memberships 
Party 
affiliation 
Legislative 
periods 
Occupation 
Hermann Fischer 17 DDP 4 Lawyer  
Albert Vögler 13 DVP 3 Engineer, Entrepreneur 
Carl Friedrich von Siemens 8 DDP 3 Engineer, Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
Hans von Raumer 6 DVP 4 Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
Florian Klöckner  6 Centre 4 Entrepreneur 
Source: see text. Legislative periods refer to the number of periods a person spend in parliament up until that point. 
Table 3: Percentage share of politically connected firms by sector  
 All type of connections Connected to the government 
 December 1924 
Banking 15.7 13.7 
Insurance 23.3 18.6 
Mining  25.6 25.6 
Heavy industy 7.3 6.1 
Light industry 7.5 7.0 
Food processing 9.1 9.1 
Transportation 22.4 19.4 
Chemical industry 7.5 5.7 
Public utility 23.8 22.2 
Others 9.5 8.4 
All firms 12.3 11.1 
 December 1928 
Banking 17.4 13.0 
Insurance 10.0 7.5 
Mining  25.8 25.8 
Heavy industy 5.5 5.0 
Light industry 4.6 4.6 
Food processing 6.1 4.6 
Transportation 22.6 22.6 
Chemical industry 7.6 7.6 
Public utility 15.9 15.9 
Others 4.6 4.6 
All firms 9.3 8.8 
Source: see text 
Table 4: Differences between all connected and unconnected firms 
  Any political connections No political connections 
Panel A: all firms December 1924 
Share capitala 18.9*** 7.8 
Firm age 37.8** 32.9 
Board size 13.8*** 8.8 
Distance to Berlinb 235.0 246.2 
End-of-year pricec 28.8** 20.6 
Panel B: all firms December 1928 
Share capital 33.7*** 7.6 
Firm age 37.0* 33.1 
Board size 15.9*** 9.3 
Distance to Berlinb 260.6 239.5 
End-of-year pricec 146.8* 122.8 
Table contains mean values of various firm characteristics. These are compared against non-connected firms, as 
displayed in the last column, using a simple t test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: See text.  
a Share capital in million Reichsmark. 
b In kilometres. 
c In percent of the share’s face value 
 
Table 5: Differences between connected and unconnected firms in event study 
Panel A: event study sample 1924 
 Any political connection (35) 
New political 
connection (6) 
Lost political 
connection (12) 
No political 
connection (53) 
Share capitala 22.1*** 9.2*** 43.0 56.0 
Firm age 32.5*** 32.0 39.9 41.8 
Board size 13.9 10.3 13.0 13.7 
Distance to 
Berlinb 226.1 127.5 256.9 255.0 
Panel B: event study sample 1928 
  Any political connection (33) 
New political 
connections (2) 
Lost political 
connection (3) 
No political 
connection (64) 
      
Share capitala 41.0 5.7* 20.6* 40.6 
Firm age 32.6** 36.5 36.3 38.6 
Board size 14.8 9.5 18.5 13.9 
Distance to 
Berlinb 220.7 466.9** 427.2*** 229.4 
Panel C: event study sample both years 
  Any political connection (68) 
New political 
connections (8) 
Lost political 
connection (15) 
No political 
connection (117) 
Share capitala 31.1** 8.3*** 38.5 48.0 
Firm age 32.6*** 33.1 39.2 40.2 
Board size 14.4 10.1** 13.8 13.9 
Distance to 
Berlinb 223.5 212.4 291.0 239.2 
Panel D: event study both years after matching 
  Any political connection (39) 
New political 
connections (4) 
Lost political 
connection (9) 
No political 
connection (75) 
Share capitala 48.8 9.9* 46.9 49.1 
Firm age 37.2* 41.7 42.5 42.4 
Board size 15.9 12.5 15.6 15.4 
Distance to 
Berlinb 214.6 191.2 273.7 225.1 
 
Table contains mean values of various firm characteristics. These are compared against non-connected firms, as 
displayed in the last column, using a simple t test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: See text.  
a Share capital in million Reichsmark. 
b In kilometres. 
 
 
Table 6: Overview of Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) 
  
Number 
of firms ACAR (-1/+1) ACAR (0,+1) ACAR (0,+2) 
 1924 
Any political connection 35 -0.077 (-2.00)* -0.085 (-2.96)*** -0.083 (-1.95)* 
New political connection 6 -0.022 (-0.43) 0.014 (0.33) 0.057 (0.837) 
Lost political connection 12 -0.059 (-2.24)** -0.069 (-2.43)** -0.074 (-3.46)*** 
Control group unconnected firms 53 -0.059 (-2.33)** -0.055 (-2.59)** -0.065 (-2.38)** 
 1928 
Any political connection 33 0.005 (0.46) 0.006 (0.81) 0.020 (1.13) 
New political connection 2 0.021 (0.67) 0.024 (2.28) 0.111 (2.59) 
Lost political connection 3 0.052 (1.87)  0.032 ((0.73) 0.065 (2.16) 
Control group unconnected firms 64 -0.010 (-1.47) -0.002 (-0.38) 0.023 (2.90)*** 
Source: see text. Asterisks indicate whether the ACAR are significantly different from zero. Significance levels 
are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The ACARs are robust regarding outliers in the ‘any political connection’ 
group. Find boxplots for 1924 in the online appendix. Furthermore, the significance of the abnormal returns at the 
event date is checked using the rank test proposed by Corrado and Zivney.1 For none of the above connection 
types, an abnormal performance materialises. 
 
                                                          
1 Corrado and Zivney, ‘Specification and power’. 
Table 7: Results of regression CARs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES symmetric two week event window (-1;1)  asymmetric two week event window (0;2)  
                  
Any political connections -0.00261    -0.0280    
 (0.0171)    (0.0181)    
New political connections  0.0466    0.127*   
 
 (0.0407)    (0.0583)   
Lost political connections  0.0127    0.0116   
 
 (0.0468)    (0.0421)   
Index any connection   -0.00437    -0.0108  
   (0.00629)    (0.00663)  
Index new connection    0.0230    0.0569** 
 
   (0.0162)    (0.0231) 
Index lost connection    0.00744    0.00370 
 
   (0.0177)    (0.0160) 
Election 1928 0.0606** 0.0639* 0.0604** 0.0647* 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0285) (0.0225) (0.0282) (0.0216) (0.0266) (0.0214) (0.0266) 
Board size 0.00230 0.00226 0.00243 0.00226 0.00209 0.00172 0.00214 0.00172 
 (0.00162) (0.00174) (0.00165) (0.00172) (0.00198) (0.00202) (0.00196) (0.00201) 
Share capital  (log) -0.0137 -0.0107 -0.0157 -0.0106 -0.0193 -0.00700 -0.0196 -0.00683 
 (0.0134) (0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0166) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0153) 
Firm age 0.000674 0.000670 0.000657 0.000668 0.000642 0.000691 0.000648 0.000681 
 (0.000592) (0.000604) (0.000578) (0.000598) (0.000562) (0.000640) (0.000566) (0.000628) 
Distance to Berlin 0.000115* 0.000117* 0.000113* 0.000117* 3.44e-05 4.48e-05 3.42e-05 4.37e-05 
 (5.05e-05) (5.11e-05) (5.10e-05) (5.13e-05) (7.65e-05) (7.63e-05) (7.62e-05) (7.76e-05) 
Constant 0.0805 0.0243 0.117 0.0205 0.204 -0.0245 0.208 -0.0262 
 (0.205) (0.226) (0.212) (0.216) (0.266) (0.248) (0.262) (0.241) 
Observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
R-squared 0.086 0.089 0.087 0.091 0.113 0.128 0.115 0.130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at sector level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 8: Results of regression CARs, matched sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES symmetric two week event window (-1;1)  asymmetric two week event window (0;2)  
Any political connections -0.0367    -0.0297    
 (0.0294)    (0.0286)    
New political connections  0.0644    0.144*     (0.0602)    (0.0625)   
Lost political connections  0.0555    -0.00382     (0.0580)    (0.0510)   
Index any connection 
  -0.0135    -0.0105  
   (0.0101)    (0.0108)  
Index new connection    0.0330    0.0726**     (0.0231)    (0.0226) 
Index lost connection    0.0177    0.000630     (0.0196)    (0.0195) 
Election 1928 0.0441** 0.0665** 0.0455** 0.0640** 0.0924*** 0.0994*** 0.0935*** 0.103*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0270) (0.0177) (0.0255) (0.0146) (0.0233) (0.0144) (0.0228) 
Board size 0.000960 0.000994 0.00104 0.000905 0.00257 0.00182 0.00263 0.00173 
 (0.00112) (0.00115) (0.00105) (0.00121) (0.00177) (0.00148) (0.00169) (0.00150) 
Share capital  (log) -0.00535 0.00128 -0.00539 -0.000393 -0.0101 -0.00228 -0.0101 -0.000189 
 (0.0197) (0.0184) (0.0198) (0.0179) (0.0236) (0.0200) (0.0236) (0.0185) 
Firm age 0.00127 0.00139 0.00126 0.00136 0.00152 0.00151 0.00152 0.00145 
 (0.00104) (0.00120) (0.00101) (0.00119) (0.00154) (0.00146) (0.00152) (0.00145) 
Distance to Berlin 0.000129*** 0.000114*** 0.000128*** 0.000124*** 6.22e-05 7.71e-05 6.09e-05 8.23e-05 
 (2.74e-05) (3.25e-05) (2.92e-05) (2.76e-05) (5.74e-05) (4.75e-05) (5.86e-05) (4.64e-05) 
Constant -0.0419 -0.194 -0.0412 -0.162 -0.00298 -0.145 -0.00371 -0.182 
 (0.295) (0.273) (0.296) (0.256) (0.348) (0.316) (0.346) (0.281) 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
R-squared 0.107 0.111 0.112 0.111 0.124 0.142 0.126 0.155 
Sample is matched applying coarsened exact matching (CEM), as described by Iacus et al. (2011). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at sector level *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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